POLrTcAL OFFENCES IN TAIWAN

D.
During the period of the state of siege, those who commit the following acts shall be condemned to death in accordance with law:
1. Circulating rumours and beguiling the public. 2. Inciting the public to riot. 3. Disrupting the money market. 4. Forceful theft or robbery. 5. Striking by workers or traders disrupting public order. 6. Encouraging students to strike or publicly inciting others to commit crime. 7. Destroying traffic or communications, or stealing the materials thereof. 8. Disrupting water supplies, or electric or gas services. 9. Setting fires or causing flood and endangering the public safety. 10. Possessing arms, ammunition or explosives without permission. 4 Furthermore, this proclamation of the state of siege automatically carried into operation the whole body of martial law promulgated by the Chinese Nationalist Government on 29 November 1934.5 Thus, in accordance with Article 7 of the Martial Law, local administrative and judicial matters are placed under the charge of the local military commander, to whom both local administrative officials and judges are responsible. Article 8 of the above law further provides that during the period of enforcement of martial law the military, organ may try, by itself, certain offences including those against the internal and external security of the state, and those against public order and public safety. Article 11 empowers the military commander, if he deems it necessary, to stop or disperse assemblies, associations, demonstrations or petitions, and put controls on speech, teaching, newspapers, magazines, notices, posters and other publications. The military commander may also restrict or prohibit religious activities; he may prohibit strikes by traders, workers, students and others, and force the strikers to resume work; he may censor mail and telegrams and withold or confiscate them; he may inspect incoming or outgoing vessels, vehicles, aircraft and other conveyances and stop their traffic or block their primary routes; he may examine doubtful passengers, inspect private weapons, ammunition, arms, firearms or other dangerous
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articles, and withhold or confiscate them; he may carry out an examination of constructions, vessels and doubtful dwelling houses; he may order the inhabitants to evacuate or prohibit them from moving in; he may destroy properties of the people, and conduct inspections, investigations or registrations of civilian foodstuffs and other resources.
It can be said that the main significance of the proclamation of the state of siege in 1949 and the practical effect of the martial law are threefold:
First, by their sweeping generality, they have, since 1949, placed major parts of community life in Taiwan under the control and surveillance of the military authorities, that is, of the Garrison Command of the Chinese Nationalist Army.
Second, they have in fact suspended most of the guarantees and protections of individual rights and freedom written into the Chinese Nationalist Constitution. 6 For example, Article 8 of the Constitution, which guarantees personal freedom, 7 Article 10, which guarantees freedom of residence and of change of residence, Article 11, which guarantees freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication, 8 Article 12, which guarantees freedom of privacy of correspondence, 9 Article 13, which guarantees freedom of religious belief, 10 Article 14, which 6 The Constitution of the Republic of China, adopted by the National Assembly on 26 December 1946, promulgated by the National Government on 1 January 1947 and effective from 25 December 1947. 7 Article 8: Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. Except in case of flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained otherwise than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be resisted. When a person is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed a crime, the organ making the arrest or detention shall in writing inform the said person and his designated relative or friend of the grounds for his arrest or detention, and shall, within 24 hours, turn him over to a competent court for trial. The said person, or any other person, may petition the competent court that a writ be served within 24 hours on the organ making the arrest for the surrender of the said person for trial.
The court shall not reject the petition mentioned in the preceding paragraph, nor shall it order the organ concerned to make an investigation and report first. The organ concerned shall not refuse to execute, or delay in executing, the writ of the court for the surrender of the said person for trial.
When a person is unlawfully arrested or detained by any organ, he or any other person may petition the court for an investigation. The court shall not reject such a petition, and shall, within 24 hours, investigate the action of the organ concerned and deal with the matter in accordance with law. 8 Article 11: "The people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing, and publication." 9 Article 12: "The people shall have freedom of privacy of correspondence." 10 Article 13: "The people shall have freedom of religious belief." Third, the proclamation and the martial law have radically changed the judicial system in Taiwan by also suspending in effect Article 9 of the Chinese Nationalist Constitution which guarantees that except for those in active military service, no person shall be subject to trial by a military tribunal.' 3 3. The new judicial situation brought about by the proclamation of the state of siege and the martial law has its deepest impact with regard to political offences committed under the Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan. Here political offences are understood as crimes which are incidental to and form a part of political disturbances, including offences consisting in an attack upon the political order of things established in the country where committed, as well as offences committed to obtain any political object.
14 To discuss political offences in Taiwan, some other laws and a judicial interpretation must first be mentioned. 
(iii) Military trial of political offences and its summary character
By virtue of the proclamation of the state of siege on 19 May 1949," and Articles 7 and 8 of the Martial Law, 45 which were brought into operation by the proclamation, political offences have been placed since 1949 under the jurisdiction of a military court. The procedure for courtmartial is provided by the Military Trial Law. 46 As prescribed in Part Two, Chapters I147 and 11148 of this law, the military trial consists of two instances. But verbal arguments upon law and facts are made only at the first instance. The second (final) instance is expedited only in writing, without verbal arguments. 49 This summary system is a deviation from ordinary judicial procedure applied to civilians in Taiwan.
(iv) Exceptional provisions and practices for political offences
In addition to the summary nature of the military trial of political offences, particular legislation and judicial interpretations have been made, or practices established, to give the Government maximum freedom in prosecuting and punishing political offenders. These special rules have the effect of excluding political offences from the application of certain established legal principles incorporated into the Chinese Nationalist judicial system for the protection of the defendant. As a result: 3911, Article 101, Criminal Code: "A person who prepares or conspires to commit an offence specified in the preceding paragraph [see n. 34 above] shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one and not more than seven years." 40 111, Article 103, Criminal Code: "A person who prepares or conspires to commit an offence specified in Paragraph I [see n. 35 above] shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than three and not more than 10 years." 41 I1, Article 104, Criminal Code: "A person who prepares or conspires to commit an offence specified in Paragraph I [see n. 36 above] shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than three and not more than 10 years." 42 See n. 20 above. 43 0 But this limitation was struck down in effect by the Judicial Interpretation mentioned above, 51 which ruled that, once committed, a political offence should be regarded as still in a "state of continuity" until it is prosecuted. 52 This Interpretation leaves no room for application of the provisions in the Criminal Code on the limitation of the right of prosecution. Accordingly, the military courts have been prosecuting and gaining convictions in trials of political offences committed more than two decades ago. 53 2. The principle of prohibition of ex post facto law is not applicable to political offences. This prohibition has been accepted by the Chinese Nationalist Criminal Code,M Article 1 of which expressly provides that "an act is punishable only if expressly so provided by the law in force at the time of its commission." Article 2 (1) additionally provides that if the law at the time of the act and the law at the time of the trial are different, the law most favourable to the offender shall apply. Nevertheless this principle has been in fact nullified with regard to political offences. The Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, after stipulating in Article 8 (I), the confiscation of offenders' property as an additional penalty for most cases of political offences, goes further and in Article 8 (III), expressly excludes in this regard the application of the protection of Article 2 (I) of the Criminal Code. In more general terms, the foregoing Judicial Interpretation of the Council of Grand Justices, with its conception of the "continuity" of political offence, has struck down in practice the prohibition of ex post facto law for political offences, making it possible for the military courts to apply law retrospectively to an act committed prior to the enactment of the law. Accordingly, the military courts have been freely prosecuting and convicting political offenders for acts committed before 50 Article 80, Criminal Code. 51 Seen. 18, 19 above. 52 The wording of the Judicial Interpretation is: "Whoever once belonged to a rebellious organization shall be regarded as continually belonging to such until he surrenders himself." The Nationalist Government and its courts have always considered any dissent to be necessarily linked to a wide anti-governmental conspiracy, real or imaginary, and in their view any political offender is, by definition, a member of a "rebellious organization." So the above interpretation in fact covers the whole range of political offences. 4. No remission of punishment is accorded to political offenders under age. According to Article 18 (I) of the Criminal Code, "an act committed by a person who has not completed the fourteenth year of his age is not punishable." However, this provision is not applied in cases of political offence. In a recent case, two persons were convicted and sentenced to prison terms for the acts they committed 25 years ago when they were less than 14 years old. the third degree of relationship, or relative by blood within the fifth degree of relationship shields the offender, his penalty shall be reduced or remitted. This provision has been nullified with regard to the political offender by Article 4 of the Statute for Denunciation and Suppression of Rebels 62 which stipulates that everyone is under an obligation to denounce "rebels," and by Article 9 of the same statute which prescribes a penalty of imprisonment for one to seven years for anyone who knowingly fails to denounce a "rebel." Basing their decisions on these articles, the military courts have been prosecuting and convicting the spouses, parents, children, brothers, sisters and close relatives of political offenders for having failed to denounce them. 6. The system of release on parole is not applicable to political offenders. The system of release on parole is incorporated into Chapter X, Part One, of the Criminal Code, 64 which is entitled "Conditional
Release." Nevertheless, it is well-established practice that this system is not applicable to political offenders, who must serve the full term of their penalties. the detained. 8 The period of internment is three years for one term, renewable indefinitely. Thus this system of political internment may in fact amount to life imprisonment without trial. When the question of the constitutionality of the above Measures is raised, the Government sometimes turns to the Peace Preservation Measures prescribed in Part One, Chapter XII of the Criminal Code 6 9 to justify the detention system. But those provisions in the Criminal Code are applicable, by their own words, only to one who is a minor, or one who is insane, feeble-minded, deaf and dumb or alcoholic, or one who takes opium, morphine injections, cocaine or heroin, or one who makes the commission of crime a habit or profession, or commits an offence because of habits of loitering or vagrancy (Articles 86-90, Criminal Code). It would require a very tortuous interpretation of language--or a sense of humour-to advance the above provisions as legal basis for political detention. The truth is that this system is an extra-legal method used by the Nationalist Government to cope efficiently with political opposition.
4. The Chinese Nationalist Government justifies the adoption of the above laws and measures on the grounds that it is at war with the Chinese Communist Government and that those laws and measures are necessary for the maintenance of security and order in Taiwan. Before commenting further on the technical characteristics of the laws, it would be useful here to appraise the whole set of Chinese Nationalist laws concerning political offences in a broader context. Seen in perspective against the legal status of Taiwan itself and the position of the Chinese Nationalist Government therein, these laws reveal some remarkable peculiarities. Taiwan against the Chinese Nationalist Government after its taking over of the island brought about a basic change which compels a reappraisal of the whole situation. The involvement of Taiwan and the Pescadores in the Chinese Civil War was never foreseen or even contemplated by the co-signers of the Cairo Declaration. This is a typical case in which the principle of rebus sic stantibus is bound to be invoked as a basis for re-examination of an existing international agreement. Moreover, the Cairo Declaration was no more than a wartime statement 68 E.g., the cases of Fu Chen (Chung-mei), Yen Ming-sheng, Yu Hsi-ming. 69 See n. 20 above. http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/9
POLrrIcAL OFFENCES IN TuwAN of the expectation of the four Allied Powers at the time when the war was still going on, its outcome uncertain, with Japan still in firm possession of Taiwan. Therefore, the above expectation could have no legal effect unless it were incorporated into a peace treaty with Japan. The Peace Treaty signed between Japan and the Allied Powers in 1952 and the Peace Treaty signed between the Nationalist Government and Japan in 1952 merely stated that Japan renounced "all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores," but nowhere did these treaties specify the beneficiary of the Japanese renunciation. On the other hand, the Atlantic Charter of 1941 stated that there should be "no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." Article 1 of the United Nations Charter provides that "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" should be one of the basic guiding principles of international relations, and the Charter further stipulates in Article 103 that in the event of conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreements, the obligations under the Charter shall prevail. In view of the foregoing, so far as Taiwan is concerned, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration not only lack legal effect, they violate the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter and must be regarded as superseded by the latter. Therefore, from the point of view of international law, it can only be said that Taiwan was detached from Japan, but has not been attached to any other country. That is, Taiwan's international legal status has been undetermined since the end of the Second World War. 70 Second, there is the position of the Chinese Nationalist Government. This Government was asked to accept the Japanese surrender in Taiwan and the Pescadores on behalf of the allied powers in 1945, and continues to constitute an army of belligerent occupation on the islands. This status of occupation army has not been altered either by the peace treaties with Japan, or by the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China. Therefore the present position of the Nationalist Government in Taiwan can only be defined as an exiled government which administers on behalf of allied powers a former colonial territory detached from Japan, and to which, by international law, the local inhabitants are not bound by any duty of allegiance.7
Third, there is the perpetual nature of the purported "state of siege" proclaimed by the Nationalist Government over Taiwan. Clinging to the fiction that it is the sole legitimate government of all China, the Nationalist Government views the Communist victory in China as nothing but a "state of Communist rebellion." Therefore, the "national emergency" or "martial law" declared by the Government when it was evicted from China must last as long as the "period of Communist rebellion," that is, until the Nationalist Government "recovers" the Chinese Mainland. The permanent character of the "state of siege," "national emergency" or "martial law" in Taiwan resulting from this position also gives foundation to the charge that the Government's tenacious refusal to accept reality and its exertions to perpetuate indefinitely this two-decade-old abnormality are simply grossly cynical devices to suspend the constitutional guarantees, deny political freedom and suppress the legitimate aspirations of the local population, all for the convenience of the authoritarian control of the regime.
Fourth, the local inhabitants have not participated to a fair and reasonable degree in the making of the laws in question. Of the 1,500-odd members of the National Assembly which resolved to give the President extraordinary emergency powers, the representatives of the people of Taiwan numbered 32; of about 460 members of the Legislative Yuan which passed the above special laws, the representatives from Taiwan numbered 17. The paradoxical fact is that it is the inhabitants in Taiwan who are now bearing the brunt of those laws which were enacted purportedly to cope with a "Communist rebellion" in which they had no part. Since the Nationalist Government was exiled to Taiwan 21 years ago, any attempt to point out the fact that the war between the Nationalist and the Communist Chinese has become verbal rather than military and the situation has become well stabilized, to urge the Government to face and accept reality, to demand that the Government normalize the situation and restore civil liberties, or to suggest that the political future of Taiwan should be determined in accordance with the principle of self-determination by all inhabitants in Taiwan has been In brief, the peculiar situation in Taiwan with regard to political crime may be summarized as follows: in a former colony over which the sovereignty is still undetermined, an exiled government continues to enforce, for an indefinite period, emergency laws on political offences which were originally aimed at opponents in a civil war, and which are now turned instead to the local inhabitants who had no part in the civil war and who did not participate in the making of the laws.
5. Some comments are now called for about the laws themselves and problems related to them. It should be noted that it is a fine point in international law to try to define how far and how long an occupational government is entitled, in administering a territory of unsettled legal status on behalf of its allies, to enforce upon local inhabitants who owe no legal allegiance to it a set of highly political "emergency" laws which presuppose the absolute allegiance of those subject to them. It should also be pointed out that in view of the actual situation the laws discussed above are no longer to be regarded as exceptional, temporary legislation amidst a short-term national crisis; rather they have become regular, permanent norms rigidly and severely imposed on political life in Taiwan.
The question of the constitutionality itself of some of those laws can readily be raised. Article 9 of the Constitution reads: "Except those in active military service, no person shall be subject to trial by a military court." ' 72 The provision is flat and without qualification. (i.e., "rebellious organization") in China before taking refuge in Taiwan.
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For those who "disrupt the money market," capital punishment is mandatory by Paragraph D (3) of the Proclamation of the State of Siege, and the terms "disrupt" and "money market" are so vague and broad that they could in effect cover the whole range of transactions. In fact, the military courts consider themselves empowered to try under this article any trader who raises commodity prices "unreasonably."7
Upon reading the laws, one is struck both by the severity of the penalties prescribed and by apparent imbalances or contradictions among those penalties. For instance, the Proclamation of the State of Siege prescribes mandatory capital punishment for anyone who "circulates rumours and beguiles the public... strikes or encourages students to strike... incites the public to riot... disrupts the money market" (Paragraph D, the Proclamation of the State of Siege). 8 Capital punishment for the sort of offences mentioned above is rather stem, but equally peculiar is that much lighter penalties are provided for apparently far more grave offences, such as "to prepare or conspire to destroy the national polity, seize state territory, change the constitution by illegal means or overthrow the Government" (punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, Article 2 (III), Statute for Punishment of Rebellion); "to prepare or conspire to deliver a government army to rebels or lead an army to surrender to rebels" (punishable by imprisonment for not less than three years and not more than 10 years, Article 3 (II), Statute for Punishment of Rebellion); "to prepare or conspire to communicate with a foreign state or its agent with intent that such state or another state begin war against the Republic of China" (punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, Article 2 (III), Statute for Punishment of Rebellion); or "to prepare or conspire to communicate with a foreign state or its agent with intent to subject territory of the Republic of China to such state or another state" (punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, Article 2 (III), Statute for Punishment of Rebellion). On the other hand, penalties prescribed for similar offences sometimes vary according to different laws: Paragraph D of the Proclamation of the State of Siege provides mandatory capital punishment for a person who "circulates rumours and beguiles the public," while according to Article 6 of the Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, a person who "circulates rumours or transmits unfounded information to disturb public peace and order and beguiles the people" is 76 She lived in the cell next to the author's in 1965 in the Taiwan Garrison Command prison at Ching-tao Road in TaipeL 7 It has become a practice of the Garrison Command, when commodity prices rise, publicly to warn traders of possible indictment and "severe punishment" under this law. 78 See n. 4 above.
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AKRON LAw RE 6w punishable with imprisonment for life or for not less than seven years. Thus a military court is free to invoke either of these two clauses to render its sentence for the same offence. This perhaps reflects the state of confusion during the period when the Nationalist Government was evicted from Mainland China, when these laws were enacted with panicky haste.
The character of the military court is overwhelmingly political. It is true that Article 80 of the Chinese Nationalist Constitution reads: "Judges shall be above partisanship and shall, in accordance with law, hold trials independently, free from any interference," 7 9 and Article 160 of the Military Trial Law states: "A court-martial shall independently perform its functions of trial, free from any interference whatsoever." Article 19 of the same law also reads: "No military law enforcement officer shall, during his term of office, participate in any partisan activities." 8 0 Judicial independence, however, is something the Nationalist Government in its half-century's history has never achieved in a civil court, let alone in a military one. The officer-judge of a military court is anxious only to prove his loyalty to the regime by subjecting his decisions to government policy. Independence of the military court is rendered even more unthinkable by the very quality of the officer-judges themselves, and by the fact that the court is administratively an integral part of, and tightly controlled by, the omnipotent Garrison Command of Taiwan, headquarters of secret intelligence services whose responsibility is to assure the island's security in the broadest sense of the word. As a matter of fact, before its delivery, the court's decision on a political case must be "approved" by the security organ which arrested and investigated the defendants and which reserves the right to ask the court to alter its planned sentence, usually to the defendant's disadvantage. The courts always presume the defendant's guilt by taking the position that if one were not guilty he would not have been arrested and brought to the court. As the defendant has no right to withhold facts, he is compelled to keep building up the case against himself. Under these conditions, when a defendant is brought to trial, he is as good as convicted.
It may be of some socio-criminological interest to note that certain traditional Chinese penal conceptions have emerged in the Nationalist Government's methods for dealing with political offences. This gives the whole matter a certain Oriental flavour:
1. The system of denunciation. The duty of citizens, backed up by legal sanctions, to denounce political offenders has been formally incorporated into the Statute for Denunciation and Suppression of Rebels.n Article 4 of the Statute prescribes: "Whoever discovers a rebel 79 See n. 6 above. 
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http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/9 POLITICAL OFFENCES IN TAIwAN or suspect must secretly denounce him to local authorities or security organs. The authority concerned shall keep secret the identity of the denouncer." Article 9 of the Statute further provides: "Whoever fails to denounce or shields a rebel or suspect shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one and not more than seven years." As indicated above, because of these provisions, the leniencies accorded by the Criminal Code to a criminal offender's family who has shielded the offender are denied to the political offender's family.
2. The system of collective responsibility and guilt by association. There is a strong tendency on the part of the Government to adhere to the conception of collective responsibility and guilt by association in dealing with political offences. The "guarantee" system has been widely adopted as a security measure. Students above the junior high-school level, teachers in all public and private schools at all levels, all military personnel, civil servants, office and factory workers and persons associated with any kind of organization are required by law to offer at least two guarantors to the effect that the guarantee holds and will hold "pure and correct thoughts," is not and will not be engaged in any "anti-governmental" activity, and that the guarantors will accept "severe punishment" if the guarantee fails to live up to the terms of this guarantee. Article 5 of the Statute for Denunciation and Suppression of Rebels 82 provides:
The heads of chia, li and lin 8 3 must constantly and vigilantly make security checks of the dwellings in their areas. All personnel in offices, military units, schools, factories and all other organizations must have at least two security-guarantors. If anyone is discovered to be a rebel, his guarantors and direct superior shall be severely punished.
The same rule applies to any person applying for a passport or exit permit.
When someone is arrested or imprisoned for a political offence, he will not be released even if found not guilty, or even if he has served the full term of his sentence without oflering guarantors for his future behaviour and thoughts.
On the other hand, as a matter of practice, the members of the family, relatives and close friends of political offenders are automatically considered to be co-conspirators and suspects and are subject to various 82 Id. 83 For security and administrative reasons, all dwellings in Taiwan are organized by law into certain units and put under police supervision. The basic unit is the lin, which consists of about 10 households; above it is the li, made up of about 10 fin; according to the statutes, the chia is the next unit above this, but the unit actually in use in Taiwan is called the ch'u. Each unit has its own head who is responsible to the police and supervises the members of the households under his jurisdiction.
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[Vol. 6:2 will in the near future "recover" the Mainland of China constitute the foundation of the Government and its state policy. From this position, the regime has proclaimed a state of siege and imposed martial law for the past two decades, and is resolved to maintain this state for an indefinite period of time in the future. This permanent state of "national crisis" has had a fatal impact on political life in Taiwan.
Second, there is no real intention on the part of the Nationalist regime to abide by its own laws in the matter of political offences. It is too readily inclined to take recourse to extra-legal means in dealing with critics and opposition.
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